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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5814
Newly independent South Sudan faces a challenge in 
making its own way in infrastructure development. 
Despite earning $6 billion in oil revenues since 2005, 
South Sudan’s spending has not been proportional to 
its income, but rather has lagged behind North Sudan’s 
development of infrastructure and social support.
   South Sudan benefitted from strong donor support 
during 2004–10, the interim period defined by the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It focused on 
reestablishing regional transport links and access to 
seaports as well as rehabilitating its ports, airstrips, and 
single rail line. South Sudan also successfully liberalized 
the ICT sector.
   Nonetheless, the new country’s infrastructure remains 
in such a dismal state that it is difficult to pinpoint a 
single most pressing challenge. The transport sector 
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Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted 
at cbricenogarmendi@worldbank.org.  
accounts for half of the country’s spending needs, and 
water and sanitation account for a further quarter of the 
total. But so many improvements are needed that the 
nation cannot realistically catch up with its neighbors 
within 10 years, or even longer.
   South Sudan’s annual infrastructure funding gap is 
$879 million per year. Given that the country’s total 
needs are beyond its reach in the medium term, it must 
adopt firm priorities for its infrastructure spending. 
It also must attract international and private-sector 
investment and look to lower-cost technologies to 
begin to close its funding gap. Although South Sudan 
loses relatively little to inefficiencies, redressing those 
inefficiencies will be vital to creating solid institutions 
to attract new investors and get the most out of their 
investments. 
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The results of South Sudan’s referendum were finalized in February 2011. Over 98 percent of the 
votes favored secession from the all parts of Sudan. Going forward, South Sudan faces the major hurdle 
of overcoming policy and capacity challenges and determining the priorities of its overall development 
agenda. Since 2005 the government of South Sudan (GOSS) has generated over $6 billion in oil reserves, 
more than half during the 2008 oil spike, yet social and infrastructure spending has not been remotely 
proportional to this accruing oil wealth. On the contrary, public spending and the actual provision of 
services supporting infrastructure and social needs have lagged what was accomplished in other parts of 
Sudan before the split.  
During the six-year interim period, 2005–10, defined in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), 
South Sudan benefited from the strong support of donors. In the transport sector the priority was to 
reestablish regional and interstate links and access to seaports, and to rehabilitate the only rail line, as well 
as river ports and airstrips. Meanwhile, South Sudan saw notable improvements in the information and 
communication technology (ICT) sector as it became increasingly liberalized. Recent efforts have been 
concentrated on strengthening institutions and creating the basic capacity needed to implement projects 
and maintain and administer infrastructure. 
Nonetheless, the state of South Sudan’s infrastructure is in complete disarray, making it difficult to 
pin down the single most pressing infrastructure challenge. Existing infrastructure problems (whether 
related to assets, capacity, or institutions) are daunting; it is simply not realistic to expect—even in the 
most optimistic scenario—that the south will catch up with neighboring countries, even those in a similar 
income bracket, in a period of 10 years or even more. Estimates based on very modest illustrative targets 
indicate spending needs on the order of $1.4 billion per year over a decade—more than three times as 
much as the country has been spending in recent years, even under the CPA. Capital expenditure would 
account for 80 percent of this spending requirement. The transport sector accounts for half of the 
spending needs, and the water and sanitation sector for a further quarter of the total. 
In terms of the size of its economy, South Sudan’s infrastructure spending needs are huge relative to 
the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) (around 23 percent of GDP annually) but small relative to the 
average estimated needs for other African fragile states—likely because of oil’s large contribution to the 
economy. The resource influx due to oil exports obviously plays in favor of South Sudan’s potential to 
afford the long term massive interventions in infrastructure. Other countries have proven that it is, in fact, 
possible to reach such high levels of spending. China, for example, invested 15 percent of its GDP per 
year in infrastructure over 15 years. during the mid-2000s. The estimate for South Sudan’s infrastructure 
capital investment alone  is 18 percent—larger, yet within the ranges observed in China. but not 
unimaginable. But the daunting conditions faced in South Sudan across the board make the possibility 
that existing spending will be boosted to the level required—not to speak of maintaining this level over a 
decade—highly unlikely for the country. 
Given that such levels of spending are beyond reach in the medium term, only by using an 





South Sudan’s infrastructure situation become manageable. This makes it absolutely critical to adopt 
sound principles for the prioritization of many competing infrastructure needs.  
South Sudan already spends approximately $450 million per year on infrastructure, equivalent to 
about 7.5 percent of GDP. A further $36 million a year l is wasted due to inefficiencies. This makes that 
the country’s annual infrastructure funding gap amounts to $879 million per year, or roughly 15 percent 
of GDP. The largest funding gap—equivalent to 40 percent of South Sudan’s needs—is in the water and 
sanitation sector. Transport comes a close second, with its needs representing 35 percent of the total. 
Power is in third place, but has significant requirements. South Sudan can build on potential inflows of 
financing from China and the private sector, particularly in the power sector, to close these gaps. But the 
ongoing instability in the country may deter investors. Meanwhile, adopting lower-cost technologies can 
help the country develop a strong infrastructure backbone and pave the way for growth and productivity 
in the near future. Finally, if all else fails, it may be necessary to realistically extend the time horizon for 
meeting the infrastructure targets beyond the illustrative period of 10 years considered here. In the case of 
South Sudan, the total amount of the cost of inefficiencies is low relative to the economy, since the actual 
provision of services is almost nonexistent. Addressing inefficiencies will not only result in modest gains 
in the short run but will be vital to creating solid institutions for attracting new investors and getting the 
biggest bang for their buck in coming years. 
The continental perspective 
The Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) has gathered and analyzed extensive data on 
infrastructure in more than 40 Sub-Saharan countries, including all parts of Sudan. The results have been 
presented in reports covering different areas of infrastructure—ICT, irrigation, power, transport, and 
water and sanitation—and different policy areas, including investment needs, fiscal costs, and sector 
performance. 
This report presents the key AICD findings for South Sudan, allowing the country’s infrastructure 
situation to be benchmarked against that of its African peers. South Sudan is a newly independent 
country, affected by conflict, endowed with oil, but poor in terms of infrastructure and economic 
development. Because of these factors, both low-income, fragile states and resource-rich benchmarks will 
be used to evaluate its performance. Detailed comparisons will also be made with immediate regional 
neighbors in the East African Community (EAC).  
Several methodological issues should be borne in mind. First, because of the cross-country nature of 
the data collection, a time lag is inevitable. The period covered by the AICD runs from 2001 to 2006. 
Most technical data presented are for 2006–07 (or the most recent year available), while financial data are 
typically averaged over the available period to smooth out the effect of short-term fluctuations. Second, to 
make comparisons across countries, the indicators and analysis were standardized so that everything was 
done on a consistent basis. This means that some of the indicators presented here may be slightly different 
from those that are routinely reported and discussed at the country level. Third, in terms of nomenclature, 
all parts of Sudan refers to Sudan prior to the split of the country, Sudan refers to the northern part of 





were originally collected and processed for the country as a whole, that is, all parts of Sudan. But given 
recent geopolitical events, including the secession of South Sudan from the rest of the country, and the 
vast differences between Sudan and South Sudan in terms of topography, infrastructure, and financial 
resources, this report presents analyses and results that reflect the situation in South Sudan as much as 
possible. In a few cases this involves relying on imperfect data and using proxy variables to attribute 
otherwise global estimates. 
Why infrastructure matters 
The results of South Sudan’s referendum were finalized in February 2011. Over 98 percent of the 
votes favored secession from all parts of Sudan. Political negotiations over major macroeconomic issues 
such as debt, oil, and currency are ongoing. The GOSS is preparing for a transition from an autonomous 
subnational government to a sovereign state. Going forward, it faces the major hurdle of overcoming 
policy and capacity challenges and determining the prioritization of its overall development agenda.  
South Sudan presents the stark divide between economic reality and unrealized potential. South 
Sudan has around 25 percent of all parts of Sudan’s land area. The area contains a majority of the oil 
reserves and has the best-quality agricultural land. Since 2005 the GOSS has generated over $6 billion in 
oil reserves—more than half during the 2008 oil spike—yet social and infrastructure spending has not 
been remotely proportional to this accruing oil wealth. On the contrary, public spending and the actual 
provision of services supporting infrastructure and social needs have lagged behind what was previously 
achieved in all parts of Sudan.  
Adequate infrastructure is the key to economic growth. Empirical evidence suggests that 
infrastructure has made positive contributions to per capita growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, but to varying 
degrees. Between 2001–05, infrastructure contributed as little as 0.14 percent (Togo) and as much as 1.7 
percent (Mauritius) to per capita growth across African countries. For all parts of Sudan the contribution 
of infrastructure was similar to that of Mauritius.  
 Estimates of infrastructure’s contribution to growth in South Sudan are unavailable. But the Central 
African Republic and Sierra Leone (by virtue of being landlocked or fragile states) and the Republic of 
Congo (because of its natural resource endowments) provide a rough point of reference. Consistently in 
these countries, infrastructure’s contribution to growth has been between 0.5 and 1 percentage point of 
per capita growth. In most cases, ICT and roads led the contribution.  
Looking forward, infrastructure could potentially contribute much more to per capita growth than it 
has in the past (figure 1b). Based on simulations done in the suggested country comparators, the impact of 
improved infrastructure might be expected to boost per capita growth by 3.5 percentage points. While all 
areas of infrastructure—including ICT, power, and transport—need to be upgraded, improvements in 
power can impact growth the most. The contributions from infrastructure vary depending on how much 





Figure 1a. Infrastructure’s historic contribution to economic growth 
 
Source:  Calderón 2009. 
Note: ICT = information communication and technology; CAR = Central African Republic. 
 
Figure 1b.  Infrastructure’s potential contribution to future economic growth 
 
Source: Calderón 2009. 
Note: ICT = information communication and technology; CAR = Central African Republic. 
 
Specific data for South Sudan indicate its predicament. Inadequate infrastructure belittles the 
productivity of firms. In the state of Central Equatoria, power outages force 100 percent of firms to own 
backup generators to self-generate power. At least 50 percent of firms (particularly large firms) and 
almost 70 percent of small firms report that electricity is a major constraint on doing business (World 
Bank 2009a). Further, high costs associated with ports, transport, and trade logistics impact the business 































































































The state of South Sudan’s infrastructure 
South Sudan is sparsely populated, with small pockets of economic activity centered on two main 
urban centers, Juba and Malakal (figure 2a). The Nile spans much of all parts of Sudan’s territory; in 
South Sudan, the vast wetlands of the upper Nile region are among the largest in the world. The 
tributaries of the Nile—the White Nile and Blue Nile—meet in Khartoum in the north. The White Nile 
crosses South Sudan from the Ugandan border while the Blue Nile flows through east and central Sudan 
and irrigates a large part of the Sudanese land confluence to form the River Nile (figure 2b). South Sudan 
is endowed with significant natural resource wealth in the form of minerals, metals, and oil (figure 2c). 
The area’s infrastructure backbone has until now received scant attention, but the urgent need for its 
development has put it on top of the policy agenda. South Sudan is an emerging landlocked country 
dependent on its neighbors to the north and south for access to the sea, including connectivity with an 
undersea fiber-optic cable. Meanwhile, the development of water resources is critically linked to 
international water agreements that are yet to be defined. All the riparian rights of the Nile will need to be 
revised in the region’s new geopolitical context.  
Figure 2. South Sudan’s demography, topography, and natural resources  
a. Demography 
 








c. Natural resources 
 
 






Road density in South Sudan is among the lowest in Africa; connections with neighbors are limited, 
especially in the north. Connectivity to Sudan is via river or air. On the limited roads, most traffic is 
between Juba and Uganda (and the northern corridor), which in turn links South Sudan with the rest of 
East Africa (figure 3a). Elsewhere on the network, traffic is sparse and road conditions are patchy at best. 
The distant port at Mombasa, Kenya, provides connectivity to the sea. 
Similar to the other infrastructure sectors, the power generation and transmission networks are in an 
embryonic state. There is only a very small distribution network in Juba; in the rest of the country, power 
networks are nonexistent and power provision is limited to small-scale thermal generation (figure 3b).  
South Sudan is naturally endowed with water, as the Nile feeds large irrigated areas. But even though 
over 50 percent of the land is suitable for cultivation, less than 4 percent of the total land is currently 
cultivated, and agricultural production is primarily for subsistence (figure 3c). 
South Sudan’s ICT market is still underdeveloped: even the semblance of an ICT backbone has not 
yet been put in place. The country would do well to take advantage of Sudan’s and Uganda’s connections 
to a submarine cable. In sum, significant improvements are needed to improve South Sudan’s 
connectivity (figure 3d). 
Figure 3. South Sudan is yet to develop infrastructure backbones  
a. Roads in South Sudan  b. Power in South Sudan 
   





c. ICT in Sudan and South Sudan  d. Water in Sudan and South Sudan 
   
Source: AICD.   
 
This report begins by reviewing the main achievements and challenges in each of South Sudan’s 
major infrastructure sectors (table 1). Thereafter, attention will turn to the problem of how to finance 
outstanding infrastructure needs.  
Table 1. Achievements and challenges in South Sudan’s infrastructure sectors  
Sector  Achievements   Challenges 
Roads  Reestablishing regional and interstate 
links and access to sea ports. 
Maintaining existing assets; developing institutions; achieving 
better and all-season connectivity; reducing freight costs by 
improving road quality and balancing trading patterns; 
overcoming the enormous construction costs; overcoming 
implementation capacity constraints; increasing rural 
connectivity. 
Air transport  Growing the air transport market. 
Increasing connectivity with East Africa. 
 
Rebuilding and improving airport quality; introducing safety 
oversight and attaining safety standards. 
Water and sanitation  Creating a very basic institutional 
framework and initiating essential sector 
strategic assessments and feasibility 
studies to rehabilitate the sector. 
Bringing together all water-related 
functions under the Ministry of Water 
Resources and Irrigation. Implementing 
projects to invest in the water and 
sanitation sector. 
Increasing access to improved water and sanitation services; 
improving the efficiency of the water utility; overcoming 
enormous construction costs; overcoming implementation 
capacity constraints; maintaining existing assets. 
 
Energy  Initiating a feasibility analysis of 
hydropower plants. 
Introducing some type of pragmatic and cost-effective means 
of lighting via off-grid electrification schemes; redressing the 
massive system losses and tackling a pervasive culture of 
noncollection of bills; overcoming large operational 
inefficiencies of the power utility; tapping into Eastern Africa 
Power Pool’s (EAPP’s) energy market; creating conditions to 









Signing a memorandum of 
understanding for the ICT sector. 
Increasing competition from several 
mobile operators and thus reducing 
prices. 
Increasing telecommunications coverage; reducing costs of 
Internet services while increasing access; establishing overland 
connectivity to fiber-optic cable. 
Source: Summary based on analysis presented in this report. 
Transport 
Figure 4. National and regional transport networks in South Sudan  
 
Source: AICD. 





 Current transport conditions 
are a major impediment to South 
Sudan’s economic and social 
activity. On average, around 60 
percent of South Sudanese firms 
rated transport as a major-to-severe 
obstacle to doing business. 
Transport concerns are especially 
acute in Malakal, where over 60 
percent of firms reported that 
transport is a major obstacle. In 
contrast, a smaller percentage of 
firms (15–21 percent) in Sudan 
(excluding Nyala in the Darfur region) reported that 
transport impeded their ability to conduct business 
(figure 5). 
Fragmented and underdeveloped corridors, high 
costs, and complicated trade logistics contribute to the 
difficulties associated with transport.  
Corridors  
The absence of a regional transport backbone 
connecting South Sudan and its neighbors hinders 
growth and regional integration. On the border with 
Uganda and Kenya, the regional road network is 
confined to one main artery. The road connecting 
Juba with East Africa is the most travelled and the 
only road network that is generally in good or fair 
condition. Connectivity to Sudan is underdeveloped; 
the relevant regional corridor is in bad condition and 
records very low traffic volumes. During the rainy 
season (between April/May and October/November), 
a majority of the roads in South Sudan are 
impenetrable. 
As a result of very poor road quality, South Sudan’s corridors record among the slowest-moving 
traffic rates in the world. Freight movement in Africa as a whole is no faster than the pace of a horse and 
buggy, and performance in South Sudan is even grimmer. The average pace of 6.4 kilometers an hour 
(kmph) is comparable to what is observed in landlocked central Africa (table 2). In part, these slow travel 
times are due to the absence of well-developed road transport infrastructure. 
Table 2. Benchmarking Sudan and South Sudan’s 
national network with African aggregates for regional 
corridors 
Corridor 






(US cents per 
tonne-km) 
Western  72  6  8 
Central  49  6.1  13 
Eastern  82  8.1  7 
Southern  100  11.6  5 
Sudan  26  8.5–13.5  8–10 
South Sudan  0  6.4  20 
Source: Teravaninthorn and Raballand 2009; Nathan 2010; 
UNLJC and FAO 2005; Yoshino 2010. 
Note: Estimates for Sudan based on routes: Khartoum to Kosti and 
Khartoum to Port Sudan. For South Sudan, costs are based on 
varying estimates for travel between Juba to Nimule.   
Implicit velocity is the total distance divided by the total time taken 
to make the trip, including time spent stationary at ports, border 
crossings, and other stops. 
 





















































































































Moving along corridors within South Sudan and between South Sudan and Sudan often requires the 
use of multimodal transport, further increasing transit times. Multimodal transport is the only option 
during half the year, when roads are unavailable during the rainy season. River transport services are 
underdeveloped, ports are underdeveloped, and commercial vessels are old. The services are limited 
between Juba and Kosti, mainly transporting goods delivered by train from Port Sudan to Kosti, about 
1,400 km away from Juba. Freight that has to move via river takes six days longer than if it were to travel 
only by road (table 3).  
Since South Sudan is landlocked, it depends on its neighbors to access coastal gateways. One option 
is accessing Port Sudan via 
Khartoum in Sudan. But the harsh 
intervening terrain makes this a 
difficult option. Further, compared to 
regional benchmarks, container dwell 
time at Port Sudan is over four times 
that of global best practices, truck 
cycle time for the receipt and 
delivery of cargo is 24 times higher 
than global benchmarks, and crane 
productivity is less than a third of 
what is observed in other parts of Africa. Another coastal gateway available is Mombasa, Kenya, through 
Uganda. Cultural and geographic considerations aside, trading via Mombasa is the most economically 
viable option for South Sudan.  
South Sudan might also rely on Lamu, Kenya, which is north of Mombasa, as a gateway to ship oil to 
overseas destinations in the future. An important consideration for South Sudan is the significant port 
congestion problems that currently plague both Port Sudan and Mombasa. As they significantly exceed 
their handling thresholds, both ports are facing extended dwell times and delays (though such challenges 
are more acute in Port Sudan than in Mombasa). As South Sudan becomes better integrated with East 
Africa, it is recommended that it rely more on Lamu and Mombasa, particularly considering the 
inefficiencies to be encountered at Port Sudan.  
High costs 
Freight tariffs in South Sudan are as high as $0.20 per tonne-kilometer (tonne-km)—twice those 
found in Sudan and four times those in South Africa, the continent’s best performer (table 2). These costs 
are a direct economic consequence of South Sudan’s poor surface transport infrastructure and place a 
significant cost burden on transport users and suppliers. The average transport tariff between Juba and 
Kampala is $0.18 per tonne-km, or three times the average tariff paid to transport goods from Mombasa 
to Kampala (approximately $0.06 per tonne-km). Consequently, the overall cost of transporting goods 
over 980 km between Mombasa and Kampala is $115, and barely covers half the cost of transporting 
goods between Juba and Kampala, a distance of 630 km (Yoshino 2010).  
Poor transport infrastructure forces trucks to carry small loads and face much longer travel times. 
Small loads automatically increase the average unit cost of transportation. For instance, limitations along 




transport  Time (days) 
Cost per tonne-
km (US$) 
Khartoum–Malakal  Road and river  7  75 
   Road  5  107 
Khartoum–Juba  Road and river  13.5  127 
  Road  7.5   
Malakal–Juba  River  2  270 
Source: AICD calculations based on data from Yoshino and others (2009); UNJLC and 





the Juba Bridge preclude trucks from carrying any more than 45 tonnes. The poor-quality infrastructure in 
the south also makes travel times much longer. For example, poor roads between Yei and Kaya (South 
Sudan’s border with Uganda) prolong the travel time of the 90 km journey between the two cities to 24 
hours (at an average velocity of 4 kmph), increasing the actual and opportunity costs of travel. 
The price differential between South Sudan’s freight tariffs and neighboring countries is also 
explained by the asymmetry of trading patterns between South Sudan and the East African neighbors who 
are its largest trading partners. The trucking companies that operate in South Sudan are mainly Kenyan or 
Ugandan companies. These trucks return empty from South Sudan to Uganda, increasing the costs for 
transport services significantly and creating a de facto barrier to trade. These costs are then transferred to 
the customer (Yoshino 2010). 
Red tape also adds to the costs. Trucks encounter many transit bottlenecks that require formal or 
informal payments to clear. By way of example, a truck transporting sacks of onions from Kassala to 
Malakal was subject to tax and fee payments at about 20 different locations, totaling 2,000 SDG ($800) 
(Yoshino 2009).  
In sum, transport costs are genuinely high and passed through to customers, making South Sudan an 
expensive place to trade. Around 16  percent of the total cost of production in the food-and-beverage 
sector can be directly attributed to transport (World Bank 2009b)  
Logistics 
Poor infrastructure, coupled with high costs, contributes to the long times and costs associated with 
moving freight within and outside South Sudan. Comparing the competitiveness of the key (and potential) 
trading arteries—Mombasa or Port Sudan to Juba—suggests that Mombasa is the more competitive 
option for inbound goods to South Sudan, based on times and costs associated with moving along these 
arteries. Transit times can be broken down into four components: the travel times of moving goods, 
determined by time of travel based on effective velocity along each corridor; the administrative time spent 
importing goods to a country; port time, based on the time taken to clear goods at ports; and border time, 
or the delays incurred when crossing borders. Transport costs are based on unit costs of moving freight 
along specific corridors, whereas administrative costs are based on costs involved in transporting imports 
into a country. Port and border delays are quantified into costs based on the assumption that delays cost 
$5 per day per tonne of imports. 
On average, importing freight to South Sudan takes between 30 and 60 days from the coastal 
gateways of Mombasa or Port Sudan. Mombasa emerges as the best trading route for imports from 
overseas destinations to South Sudan (figure 6). Two reasons underscore the differences in transit times 
for imports. First, the inefficiency of port services—particularly the long dwell times at Port Sudan—
significantly prolong travel times. And port-related charges increase the total cost of moving transport by 
as much as 25 percent (figure 7). Second, the road transport network between Juba and Port Sudan is 
available for only half the year since roads are impenetrable during the rainy season. Freight that has to 





Figure 6. Port and river transport inefficiencies increase the transit times of imports bound for South Sudan  
 
Source: Port data from AICD based on 2006 estimates, road transport times based on AICD calculations, river transport times from KEER-
MISC data from 2007, border delays data from Nathan (2010) and Yoshino (2010), and administrative times from Trading across Borders, 
World Bank. 
Note: The administrative times are based on aggregates for all parts of Sudan as a whole since data for South Sudan are not currently 
available. 
  
Figure 7. Road and river transport costs compose the lion’s share of prices for importing freight to South Sudan 
 
Source: Port data from AICD based on 2006 estimates, road transport times based on AICD calculations, border delays data from Nathan 
(2010) and Yoshino (2010), and administrative times from Trading across Borders, World Bank. 
Note: The administrative times are based on aggregates for all parts of Sudan as a whole since data for South Sudan are not currently 
available. 







































































































National road infrastructure 
Achievements 
During the six-year interim period (2005–10) defined in the CPA, donors strongly supported South 
Sudan’s infrastructure agenda. In the transport sector the priority was to reestablish regional and interstate 
links and access to seaports through 4,000 km of roads reestablishing access to Sudan, Uganda, and 
Kenya.  
Challenges 
Road transport networks in South Sudan are either nonexistent or in extremely poor condition (figure 
8). The road transport network has inadvertently fragmented the country; quality road links to connect the 
different parts of South Sudan are missing. For example, road links that connect the Upper Nile State with 
Juba are in poor condition. Further, a lack of linkages to its neighbors isolates South Sudan—for example, 
there is no connectivity with Sudan. The few links that do exist are not navigable at present. There is 
essentially only one route that links South Sudan to the external world—namely, the route from Juba 
south toward the Ugandan border.  
Figure 8. South Sudan road quality  
 





The road sector in South Sudan is one of the worst in Africa, and performs well below African low-
income, middle-income, and resource-rich country benchmarks in all respects. The problem is twofold. 
The country’s economy is constrained by the sheer absence of roads and by the fact that any existing 
roads are of very poor quality. Less than 2 percent of the primary network is paved, and no paved roads 
are in good condition. Less of than a third of the unpaved roads are in good condition, and during the 
rainy season, which lasts half the year, the unpaved roads are impassable. Most traffic travels along 
unpaved roads, but the traffic volumes are too low to justify paving them (figure 9). 




The high unit costs of road construction impede the expansion of road infrastructure networks in 
South Sudan. A unit-cost analysis for interurban road rehabilitation and reconstruction across African 
countries indicates that the cost of construction of roads in South Sudan is extremely high (table 4). 
Several factors drive these high costs. First, in South Sudan, a construction boom—a typical phenomenon 
in a postconflict economy—prompted high demand for construction but was stymied by inelastic supply 
due to a limited supply base for construction work and the limited tradability of the construction work 





Construction materials that are normally 
unavailable locally are very expensive due to the 
large costs associated with shipping them to a 
construction site (World Bank 2009a). This is 
exacerbated by the limited information on the 
potential of infrastructure development and upcoming 
investments, and by poor procurement practices. 
Added to this are questions of political stability and 
security, factors that tend to improve as a country 
moves forward or, as in the case of South Sudan, 
consolidates into itself. Meanwhile, costs are being 
pushed up by a shortage of skilled operators and 
technicians and the extraordinarily high cost of living 
faced by the mobilized labor force. The domestic 
construction industry is very underdeveloped and, last but not least, the widespread incidence of land 
mines that need to be cleared prior to construction further increases costs. Until the institutional capacity 
needed to handle these and other challenges is established, the road sector is not on track to improve.  
Table 5. South Sudan’s road indicators benchmarked against those of African peers 














Classified road density 
Km per 1,000 sq-km of arable 
land area  15  88  101  278  57 
Paving ratio  % of primary network paved  2  71.6     32  82.1 
GIS rural accessibility 
% of rural population within 2 
km of an all-season road     23  21  32  20 
Paved road traffic  AADT   0  1,341  1,549  3,798  1,408 
Unpaved road traffic  AADT  53  39  47  75  54 
Classified network condition 
Percentage in good or fair 
condition  0  86  59     80 
Overengineering 
Percentage of main road 
network overpaved relative to 
traffic flows     30     18  15 
Paved network condition 
% of paved roads in good or 
fair condition  0  86  79  82  68 
Unpaved network condition 
% of unpaved roads in good or 
fair condition  30  56     58  61 
Source: Derived from AICD calculations. 
Note: For South Sudan: the paving ratio is calculated based on the classified road network that is paved, the paved network condition refers to  
regional and national roads, the paved road network does not include roads of fair quality because the length of roads with fair quality is 
unknown. 
GIS = geographic information system; AADT = average annual daily traffic. 
 
Table 4. Cost of rehabilitation and reconstruction of 
two-lane interurban roads 
Country 
Average unit cost ('000 
US$/km) 
Congo, Dem. Rep. of  229 
Ghana  261 
Mozambique  279 
Nigeria  330 
Ethiopia  388 
Malawi  421 
South Sudan  760-1000 
Source: Taken from World Bank (2009a), originally in Alexeeva, 





South Sudan’s road sector institutions have serious limitations that hinder their ability to effectively 
and efficiently implement major road programs. The country also lacks the required policy and 
institutional framework. Key constraints hindering the implementation of road works include: inadequate 
implementation capacity; lack of capacity to manage, maintain, and operate existing and new 
infrastructure; and inability to apply internationally recognized safety and security standards (box 1). A 
lack of reliable data is also a problem to overcome. 
South Sudan’s fragmented transport infrastructure networks have impeded agricultural producers in 
remote areas from effectively connecting to market centers. Even though the land area with high 
agricultural potential in Sudan and South Sudan is about the same at around 650,000 square kilometers 
each, the potential has been vastly underutilized in South Sudan (table 6a). In Sudan 75 percent of the 
arable land yields a moderate—yet acceptable—10 and 50 percent of its agricultural value, while in South 
Sudan close to two-thirds of the land with high suitability does not even contribute 10 percent of its value 
agricultural potential (tables 6a and 6b). 
Table 6a. Land area in Sudan and South Sudan suitable for agriculture 
Percent contribution to aggregate agriculture value  South Sudan  Sudan 
< 10% but high suitability  4,381  1.438 
10%–50%  2,279  4,793 
> 50%  54  265 
Total area of high agricultural suitability  6,714  6,496 
     
 
Table 6b. Distribution of agricultural value between Sudan and South Sudan 
Percent contribution to aggregate agriculture value  South Sudan  Sudan 
< 10% but high suitability  65  22 
10%–50%  34  74 
> 50%  1  4 
Total area of high agricultural suitability  100  100 
Source:  AICD     
 
A rough initial estimate is that close to 7,000 km of roads are needed to provide rural accessibility. To 
attain the most basic connectivity for its arable land, South Sudan will need to start by improving 2,500 
km of the national and regional networks from bad to good condition. Long lengths of feeder roads need 
to be connected to integrate rural areas with the transport backbone. Box 2 further illustrates the 





Box 1. Road sector institutions in South Sudan 
In 2005 the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) led by the United Nations and World Bank recommended that capacity 
building, development and training, and the preparation of projects for rehabilitation and development of 
infrastructure be made a priority. Emphasis was placed on developing implementation structures to facilitate 
sufficiently high fiduciary and procurement standards to enable the execution of labor-based construction activities. 
The Ministry of Transport and Roads developed a Transport Sector Policy (October 2006) and a Road Sector 
Strategy Plan, which was approved by the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA) and adopted as a 
framework for the continuing sector development program. Both of these documents presented the policy and 
regulatory reforms and institutional development required to improve road infrastructure, yet there is much work 
still pending on this front. 
These policy documents highlighted the importance of addressing transport sector issues comprehensively for all 
modes of transport—road, rail, air, river, and sea—and of developing a strategy for the largest mode, road transport. 
The road subsector policy and strategy recognized the importance and urgency of (i) defining institutional 
arrangements for policy and regulatory functions, (ii) properly managing the implementation of road maintenance 
and development projects, (iii) generating annual revenue and efficiently managing road financing, and (iv) setting 
technical standards and specifications for various road classes.  
A draft legislative bill to establish a South Sudan Roads Authority (SSRA) is currently under discussion. It is 
expected that the SSRA will be established first and then a road fund and roads board will follow when capacity is 
considered sufficient. In the meantime, funds budgeted for annual road maintenance have been allocated by the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP) on a priority basis. Until the SSRA is established, the 
planning and implementation of road maintenance programs remain the responsibility of the Roads and Bridges 
Directorate, itself under the MTR. 
Source: Louis Berger Group and Doshi Borgan & Partners. 2010. 
 
 
Beyond the 7,000 km of roads needed to remedy rural connectivity, an additional 1,300 km are 
needed to meet regional connectivity standards for key economic nodes, in particular linking Juba to the 
international frontiers. In addition, to meet urban connectivity standards, South Sudan must extend the 
paved road network to within 500 meters of urban populations. 
Two scenarios are considered to move toward these goals. In the base scenario, all infrastructure is 
maintained in good condition and higher-end surfacing options are used (asphalt for all regional, national, 
and urban roads and single-surface treatment for rural roads). In the pragmatic scenario, half the 
infrastructure is maintained in good condition and half in fair condition, and lower-cost surfacing options 
are used (single-surface treatment for national and urban roads and gravel for rural roads). 
Sizable spending requirements are needed to reach either of these goals (table 7), requiring South 
Sudan to spend $220 million–$380 million a year over the next ten years. The largest components of this 
total are improving the condition and maintenance of existing roads (table 7). 





Box 2. Transport bottlenecks for agricultural production in the Upper Nile State 
The Upper Nile State has among the greatest agricultural potential in South Sudan and accounts for 90 percent of the 
population’s income. The arable land in this region is over 70,000 acres. Gum arabic, which is widely exported, is 
grown, as are other crops such as maize, sesame, and sorghum. Despite great agricultural potential, farmers across 
the board suffer from low returns on their economic activity.  
An inadequate road network is a binding constraint on unlocking the state’s agricultural potential in the short and 
medium term. At present the road density (km per 1,000 sq km of land area) is only half of what is observed in 
South Sudan and one-fourth of the road density of Sudan as whole. The existing roads are unpaved (except for a few 
kilometers between Malakal and Renk), inadequate, and impassable during the rainy season.  
Large-scale mechanized farming and medium-scale agriculture yield low returns. One reason for this is the 
extremely poor condition of the road networks between urban and rural areas (feeder roads) and poor infrastructure, 
such as a shortage of storage facilities that constrain the expansion of farming areas. These factors have hampered 
the growth of value-added activities on existing farms and limited market access by raising input costs. Medium-
sized farmers in particular are impeded by the inadequate transportation network between Renk and Malakal (which 
is intermodal between river and road). This also increases the price for agricultural inputs from northern states. 
These farmers do not receive as much benefit as the large-scale mechanized farmers do in economizing transport 
and transaction costs.  
Small-scale farmers also suffer from low returns on their economic activity particularly due to the deficiencies in the 
urban-rural network that is required to connect these producers to markets. Average travel times to the nearest 
market in the state take very long. River transport to rural areas away from the White Nile (along Sobat River) takes 
much longer than to points along the White Nile. This points to a more acute constraint that smallholders in 
hinterlands face in accessing markets along the White Nile. 
Source: Yoshino and others 2009. 
 
Table 7. South Sudan’s spending needs for regional, national, rural, and urban connectivity 
  
Road length in good 
condition (km) 
Spending needs (US$ million per year over a 10-year period)  GDP share 
  






condition  Maintenance  Total 
   Basic scenario 
National  0  1,193  0  56  5  20  81  1.3 
Regional  0  1,307  0  157  0  35  191  3.2 
UAI  6  1,085  63  2  1  2  68  1.1 
RAI    6,969  0  12  5  24  40  0.7 
Total  6  10,554  63  227  10  81  380  6.3 
   Pragmatic scenario 
National  0  1,193  0  42  0  19  61  1.0 
Regional  0  1,307  0  62  0  22  85  1.4 
UAI  6  462  20  2  1  2  25  0.4 
RAI    6,969  0  3  1  50  54  0.9 
Total  6  9,931  20  109  2  93  224  3.7 
Source: Adapted from Carruthers, Krishnamani, and Murray (2009). 







South Sudan’s air transport infrastructure is overall very limited (figure 10). In recent years, driven by 
the development of oil and mining industries in South Sudan, passenger seats on scheduled airlines have 
grown dramatically, both internationally in Africa and with Sudan; but despite this uptick, South Sudan 
has virtually no air transport market within its own region, as measured in scheduled services (figure 11). 
The Diio SRS shows that in 2007, while there were 219,741 seats for travel within Sudan, there were only 
696 seats advertised within South Sudan (table 8). These figures may mask the fact that traffic between 
the two countries has actually grown rather significantly—from 24,452 seats in 2001 to 87,191 seats in 
2007. How much of that traffic is hub traffic through Khartoum traveling between points in South Sudan 
has not yet been determined. 
What air connectivity South Sudan does have is largely oriented toward East Africa. Most flights 
from Juba are to Kenya (Nairobi) and Uganda (Kampala) (annex 1). But the market overall is 
underdeveloped. Entry into South Sudan from most other international destinations in the past has been 
through Khartoum. 
Figure 10. Juba is the main airport in South Sudan 
 
Source: AICD. 
Beyond basic connectivity, it is also important to evaluate the convenience and speed of air travel. 





significantly higher than that of Sudan for similar destinations. South Sudan benefits from good 
connectivity with East African regional hubs namely Addis Ababa and Nairobi.  (annexes 2 and 3). 
Figure 11. Evolution of seats and city pairs in South Sudan 
a. Seats  b. City pairs 
   
Source: Bofinger 2009. Derived from AICD national database (www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data). 
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Table 8. Benchmarking air transport indicators for South Sudan1 
Country 
South 
Sudan  Sudan  Ethiopia  Chad  CAR  Kenya  Egypt 
Traffic (2007)               
Domestic travel (‘000 seats per year, excluding 
South)  0.7  218  729  n.a.  n.a.  2,093  5,959 
International travel within Africa (‘000 seats per 
year)  164  302  1,837  110  21  3,145  1,886 
Intercontinental travel (‘000 seats per year)  15  2,052  2,005  89  24  2,755  15,793 
 
Seats available per 100 people 
  1.6  9.8  5.8  1.8  1  21  27.5 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index—air transport 
market (%)  18.49  15.29  70.61  36.35  50.26  39.47  24 
Quality               
Percent of seat-km in newer aircraft  19.7  71.9  98.5  99.5  100  80.2  90.7 
Percent of seat-km in medium or smaller 
aircraft  93.3  72  39.7  93.6  23.5  20.8  51.2 
Percent of carriers passing IATA/IOSA Audit  0  0  100  0  0  11.1  50 
FAA/IASA Audit Status  No audit  No audit  Passed  No audit  0  0  Passed 
Source: Bofinger 2009.  
Note: The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. It is calculated by squaring the 
market share of each firm competing in the market and then summing the resulting numbers. A HHI of 100 indicates the market is a monopoly; 
the lower the HHI, the more diluted the market power exerted by one company/agent. 
FAA = U.S. Federal Aviation Administration; IASA = International Aviation Safety Assessment; IATA = International Air Transport Association; 
IOSA = IATA International Safety Audit. 
n.a. = Not applicable. 
Challenges 
As in other infrastructure sectors, years of conflict have resulted in the neglect and destruction of air 
transport infrastructure. As of 2007 none of South Sudan’s four airports receive regularly scheduled 
services. Three of the four have strips that are unpaved or appear in dire need of maintenance. 
South Sudan has made very few strides in attaining adequate levels of air safety. The EU currently 
has all airlines based in South Sudan blacklisted, meaning they are not allowed to fly into any EU 
member country. A complete ban of all airlines from a country is a strong indicator of systemic weakness 
in governmental oversight, as could be expected in a conflict/postconflict country. A number of small 
domestic carriers, registered generally as charter operators, are operational, but do not report information 
to a booking or ticket sales agency. The existence of these operations poses a danger to air safety because 
these operators could have minimal oversight, could operate questionable or faulty aircrafts, and the 
airlines’ training staff, maintenance crew, and pilots may not have skills consistent with acceptable EU 
standards. 
                                                 
1 All data are as of 2007 based on estimations and computations of scheduled advertised seats, as published by the 
Diio SRS Analyzer. This captures 98 percent of worldwide traffic, but a percentage of African traffic is not captured 





Regional cooperation with East Africa might be a potential solution to these and other air safety 
challenges. South Sudan could potentially benefit from the air transport developments coordinated across 
East Africa as a whole, including the newly established East African Community Civil Aviation Safety 
and Security Oversight Agency (CASSOA).  
Water resource management  




One issue that represents a big challenge is the lack of priority and attention afforded to water 
resource management; the meteorological and hydrological data collection network was destroyed during 
the conflict and is currently nonexistent, and there is very poor technical and institutional capacity overall. 
The Nile presents South Sudan’s biggest water management challenge, as well as its biggest 
opportunity. South Sudan is at the heart of the complexities associated with the Nile Basin Initiative, and 
the transboundary water management of the River Nile remains an extraordinary challenge. Around 28 
percent of the Nile water flows through South Sudan to Sudan and onward to Egypt. So far, within the 
context of the Nile Basin Initiative, Egypt and Sudan have the primary control over the Nile waters. But 
South Sudan’s independence raises the question of new uses for the Nile waters, and their allocation 
between Sudan and South Sudan. It is clear that as a country, South Sudan will explore and initiate, 
sooner rather than later, the honing of the river’s hydropower and enormous irrigation potential. Project 
development along the Nile and its tributaries can certainly augment the economic impact of the Nile 
waters flowing through the south, but all such interventions will raise questions by other riparian states 





The delicate geopolitics of the region, prior disputes, and environmental concerns complicate the Nile 
Basin’s water resource issues. At present, there is no clarity on how the water rights will be allocated now 
that South Sudan is an independent country. Yet, the cost of noncooperation is high, including the 
economic cost of negative environmental impacts, suboptimal water resources development, political 
tensions over shared resources, and foregone benefits of joint water resources development. 
Water supply and sanitation 
Achievements 
So far, South Sudan’s water resource management has been focused primarily on the planning and 
development of water for drinking in urban and rural areas, with some attention also being paid to 
irrigation. Since 2004 South Sudan has made progress in creating a very basic institutional framework and 
initiating essential sector strategic assessments and feasibility studies to rehabilitate dilapidated assets and 
manage water resources. A new National Water Policy was endorsed by the government in 2007, and the 
Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MoWRI) was established in 2008 with defined mandates and 
responsibilities. In 2008 the MoWRI awarded five contracts worth $38 million for scientific and 
feasibility studies for the construction of three medium-sized dams in Wau and the rehabilitation of the 
Maridi Dam and Water Station. The three new dams will be dedicated to fulfilling South Sudan’s needs 
for electricity and clean water; while the Maridi dam rehabilitation project is limited to public water 
supply and irrigation uses. 
South Sudan is in the final stages of preparing a water sector strategy that will include more details on 
the plan to tackle water and sanitation deficiencies. Two major projects, the South Sudan Rural Water 
Supply and Sanitation Project and the Water Supply and Sanitation project, have been financed for a total 
of $60 million. These efforts cover water and sanitation investments in both urban and rural areas and 
focus on the drilling and rehabilitation of boreholes, construction of latrines, and some distribution 
systems. 
Challenges 
Yet one-third of South Sudan’s population still relies on surface water as its main source of water, 
with only minimal reliance on utility water (table 9). The reliance on surface water in South Sudan is less 
than other East African countries on average but greater than resource-rich and middle-income countries, 
which record 27 percent and 11 percent respectively. Access to piped water is practically nonexistent, and 
over 60 percent of the population relies on wells and boreholes for access to water. In urban areas in 
particular lack of access to piped water has forced a heavy reliance on boreholes. The burgeoning use of 
wells and boreholes for water supply is becoming a policy challenge, as over half the wells and boreholes 
in Africa do not provide access to safe water.  
Three-quarters of the population does not have access to any type of sanitation facility (table 9). 
Twice as many people in South Sudan relative to other East African low-income and resource-rich 
countries rely on open defecation. Compared to middle-income countries, seven times as many people 
rely on open defecation, indicating that the sanitation situation in South Sudan is rather grave. Even in 





rural areas (figure 13). Sudan, meanwhile, has only a 10 percent open defecation rate. Almost no one in 
South Sudan has access to flush toilets compared to 5 percent of the population in Sudan and other 
African low-income countries. Access to improved latrines in South Sudan is more or less equal to low-
income and East African countries but significantly lags Sudan and all other comparator benchmarks. 
This situation is partially explained by the fact that the rural population in South Sudan accounts for 83 
percent of the population, making high-end or midrange solutions simply unaffordable. 
Table 9. Benchmarking South Sudan’s water infrastructure 
   Unit 
South 











Access to piped water  % pop  —  11  9  13  61 
Access to stand posts  % pop  2  14  17  12  22 
Access to wells/boreholes  % pop  64  32  39  47  5 
Access to surface water  % pop  34  42  34  27  11 
Access to flush toilets  % pop  0  4  5  13  48 
Access to improved latrines  % pop  19  17  18  37  34 
Access to traditional latrines  % pop  6  43  38  22  7 
Open defecation  % pop  75  36  38  28  11 
Domestic water consumption  liter/capita/day  20  64  51  115  196 
Revenue collection  % sales  83  80  94  60  99 
Distribution losses  % production  29  38  35  40  29 
Cost recovery  % total costs  40  102  89  67  86 
Operating cost recovery  % operating costs  56  143  125  94  121 
Labor costs  connections per employee  107  103  176  96  203 
Total hidden costs   % of revenue                 
Average effective tariff   U.S. cents per m3  81  76  77  45  — 
Source: Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) and AICD water and sanitation utilities database (www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data). 
Note: Access figures calculated by the AICD based on the 2000 and 2006 DHS figures published by the Joint Monitoring Program (WHO 
2010). 
— = Not available. 
 
While the urban-rural disparities in South Sudan are not as glaring as in other parts of Africa, this is 
for the wrong reason: an overall limited level of access. Similarly, there are no glaring disparities between 
various income levels. Estimations from the recent poverty assessments suggest that a staggering 64 
percent of the wealthiest quintile  of South Sudanese lacks access to any type of toilet facility. In stark 
contrast, in Sudan, only 12 percent of the wealthiest quintile of the population has no access to toilets 
compared to 50 percent of the poorest. Around 2 percent of the wealthiest quintile of South Sudanese had 
flush toilets and a further 22 percent had access to pit latrines. In terms of water supply, the wealthiest and 
poorest quintiles of the South Sudanese population relies equally on deep wells and boreholes for water. 
There is also not much variation in the usage of an open source of water (that is, surface water) across 
income levels—over 25 percent of the wealthiest quintile relies on open sources of water (World Bank 





Figure 13. Access to water supply and sanitation is inequitable between urban and rural communities in South Sudan 




The overall low rates of access are associated with decaying infrastructure and inadequate 
maintenance. The infrastructure is decrepit due to neglect during the war. Inadequate allocation of 
resources to maintenance compounds the situation further and in part explain the poor performance in the 
water supply and sanitation sectors.  
Access to quality services is so limited that it is only realistic to have an incremental approach to 
increasing access. The incremental strategy could rely on low- and midrange technologies to start, and 
then expand to higher-end alternatives for service provision in the long run. 
In 2007 the South Sudan Urban Water Corporation started water supply operations in four urban areas 
(Renk, Wau, Juba, and Malakal), but records on water production and distribution and other operational 
and financial indicators are not available, limiting further analysis on the utility’s performance. The 
limited data, however, suggest that the utility’s revenues are insufficient to cover operations, 
maintenance, and labor costs, and that the utility requires financial assistance from the government to run 
its operations. 
Despite high prices charged for water, cost recovery is only 40 percent of revenues. The average cost 
of water production in the Upper Nile Water Corporation, at $1.00–$1.20 per cubic meter, is broadly 
comparable to costs faced by utilities in other water-abundant countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Water 
tariffs are set at around $0.80 per cubic meter, on average higher than most other African benchmarks. 
But cost recovery is very low, at 40 percent of revenues. This seriously undermines the financial 
sustainability of the utility as revenues cover only around half the operational costs and none of the 





















































On the other hand, distributional losses are modest relative to other parts of Africa, revenue collection 
is promising, and labor productivity is better than several African benchmarks. Thirty percent of water 
production is lost due to leakages in the system. These losses, however, are comparable to what is 
observed in African middle-income countries and are modest relative to East Africa and South Sudan’s 
resource-rich peers. Over 80 percent of the bills are collected, which is comparable to East Africa and 
other low-income countries and significantly better than what other resource-rich countries recover. At 
107 connections per employee, labor productivity, while better than East Africa and Sudan, falls short of 
the average productivity of a utility in middle-income countries at 200 connections per employee. 
In monetary terms, the Upper Nile Water Corporation loses $1 million annually due to various 
inefficiencies. The hidden costs are slightly less than in Kenya and Ethiopia, which lose up to 150 percent 
of their revenues due to hidden costs. For South Sudan, minimizing losses to improve the financial 
viability of the utility requires addressing the cost-recovery situation, redressing system losses, and 
improving collections (table 10).  
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Average 









Upper Nile Water 
Corporation  3  29  83  1.13  0.85  1  113 
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009). 
Note: For South Sudan water delivered (million m3/year) and total hidden costs ($/year) are reported as the sum of the utilities; the other 




Except for some investment in electricity distribution in two small towns, South Sudan has had no 
significant achievements in recent years in the electricity sector. Some leeway is being made in carrying 
out feasibility analysis of micro hydropower plants but no projects have materialized. 
Challenges 
South Sudan’s power infrastructure is in an embryonic state, its development severely curtailed by 
years of civil war (figure 14). The power network consists of a few disjointed generation plants in urban 
centers. Despite the rich hydropower potential, the power is generated through expensive diesel 
generation. Estimates suggest that South Sudan has between 25 megawatts (MW) and 62 MW of installed 
capacity (table 13), or around 3 MW per million people. This is a small fraction of what has been installed 
in East Africa on average, with installed capacity per million people significantly lagging all other 
regional African benchmarks. Megawatts per million people in South Sudan equals that of Chad and is 









Access to power is very low and unequal. Estimates indicate that around 1 percent of people in South 
Sudan have access to power and this is not available through a full 24-hour period (table 11). These 
access rates are in glaring contrast with East Africa, where on average 10 percent of the population has 
access to electricity (16 percent in Kenya). These aggregates are even more striking when compared to 
other African resource-rich peers. The urban-rural divide is conspicuous when South Sudan’s benchmarks 
are compared to other African countries. Around 7 percent of South Sudan’s urban population is 
electrified compared to over half in Sudan. Virtually no one in South Sudan’s rural areas has electricity; 
around 28 percent of Sudan’s and resource-rich countries’ rural populations have access to power.  
Table 13. Benchmarking power indicators 










Access to electricity (national)  % of population  1  10  33  50  46 
Access to electricity (urban)  % of population  6.67  44  86  72.8  79.4 
Access to electricity (rural)  % of population  0     12.7  26.3  28 
Installed generation capacity  MW  25  1,169  651  36,971  4,105 
Installed generation capacity per 
million population  MW per million population  3  23  20  799  43 
Power outages   Days/year     19  10.4  5.9  14.5 
Firms that find power a constraint 
for business  % of firms   >75   55  52  31  56 















Collection rate  % billing  40   94  92  91  70 
Revenue per unit  US cents/ kWh     10.5  14  13  13 
System losses  % of generation   50  23  24  20  52 
      South Sudan  Predominantly thermal  Other developing regions 
Average effective tariff  US cents/ kWh  18–29  14.5  5.0–10.0 
Source: All data unless specified are for 2005 and based on AICD calculations; Data for South Sudan access to electricity are from 2010 and 
were obtained from World Bank (2011); data for Installed capacity for South Sudan are from 2009 and were obtained from Platts (2009); data 
for power outages were derived from Vennemo and Rosnes (2009); data for emergency generation from Eberhard and others (2008); data for 
firms that find power to be a constraint and firms with own generators are from 2007 and were obtained from World Bank (2009b); data on 
Sudan collection rate, revenue per unit, and system losses are for 2010 and were taken from World Bank (2011); data for average effective 
tariff for South Sudan are taken from World Bank (2011). For the thermal benchmark, data represent primarily residential users. 
Note: Access to electricity data for urban and rural access in South Sudan are estimates based on calculations from the AICD economic model 
for power investment needs. Installed capacity per million people was calculated based on Platts (2009). 
* The aggregate is based on manufacturing firms. 
 
South Sudan also records very limited usage of modern 
fuels for domestic consumption purposes across all income 
levels; in fact, usage is among the lowest in Africa. Recent 
poverty assessments for South Sudan found that less than 1 
percent of the richest household quintile used modern fuels 
for cooking. Around 70 percent of the wealthiest household 
quintile and around 86 percent of the country on average 
used firewood for cooking (World Bank 2010a and 2010b). 
Comparing South Sudan to other countries in Africa 
indicates that the country records extremely limited usage 
of modern fuels overall (table 12). 
Modern fuel usage for other purposes such as lighting 
does not vary significantly across urban and rural areas 
(table 12). Around 63 to 70 percent of lighting is fueled by 
firewood, paraffin lamps/lanterns, candle wax, or biogas. Around 7.4 percent of lighting in urban areas is 
provided by electricity or gas. Less than 2 percent of lighting in rural areas is powered by nontraditional 
fuels (table 13).  
Table 13. Gas and electricity powers very low levels of lighting even in urban South Sudan in 2010 
   Electricity  Gas  Public generators 
Solar 
power  Traditional fuels  No lighting 
Total  1.20  0.40  1.80  0.90  68.80  26.90 
Urban   7.10  0.30  9.60  2.50  63.60  16.90 
Rural  0.20  0.40  0.40  0.50  69.80  28.70 
Source: Southern Sudan Center for Census, Statistics and Evaluation, 2010. 
 
Businesses record limited access to power in South Sudan and indicate that power is a major 
impediment to growth and productivity. One hundred percent of firms in Malakal and 87 percent of firms 
Table 12. Even the richest households in South 
Sudan do not use modern fuels for cooking 






Sudan (2009)  36.1  64.9 
Kenya (2003)  3.45  16.52 
Nigeria (2003)  1.19  5.51 
Uganda (2001)  0.87  4.34 
Ethiopia (2005)  0.31  1.48 
South Sudan (2009)  0.3  0.8 
Tanzania (2005)  0.24  1.22 
Source: DHS various years and World Bank 2010a and 





in Juba—the two largest cities in South Sudan—indicate that power is the largest impediment to their 
business. Around 83 percent of firms in Juba own or share generators to combat erratic power supply. 
Generators supply as much as 93 percent of the total power consumption in Juba (World Bank 2009b) 
(see figure 15).  
Figure 15. Electricity is a large obstacle to business activity in South Sudan 
 
Source: World Bank 2009a. 
 
South Sudanese power prices range between $0.18 and $0.29 per kilowatt-hour (kWh). This is twice 
as much as the average African consumer pays, five times what is paid in other developing countries, and 
more than two times what is paid in Sudan (figure 16). 
Figure 16. South Sudan’s power tariffs are among the highest in Africa 
 
Source: Briceño-Garmendia and Shkaratan 2009; South Sudan’s estimates were provided by World Bank staff. 
 
The high prices reflect that South Sudan has one of the highest costs of power production in Africa 
(figure 17). The average power cost in South Sudan is as high as $0.37 per kWh, essentially double the 
average cost of power in Sub-Saharan Africa, which has been estimated at $0.18 per kWh. Part of the 
explanation behind the high power costs lies in the use of small-scale generation that precludes the system 
from benefitting from the substantial scale economies that exist in this sector. African countries with 














































































































































































































































































































high as those with larger systems (above 500 MW). South Sudan’s production is well below the minimum 
efficient scale size of around 200 MW.  
Figure 17. The costs of producing power in South Sudan are extremely high 
 
Source: Briceño-Garmendia and Shkaratan 2010. 
 
Another explanation for high costs lies in the high price of diesel in the country, reflecting the high 
cost of road transportation (table 14). It is striking that though Sudan and South Sudan are both oil-
endowed, they pay steep prices for diesel relative to other countries in Africa. Further, unlike in the 
National Electricity Corporation in Sudan that has received fuel subsidies for power production from the 
government, such subsidies have not been provided to South Sudan’s power utility, SSEC. Since the 
referendum, challenges for power production have been compounded due to even higher fuel prices 
attributed to inadequate fuel supplies coming into South Sudan from Sudan (Sudan Tribune 2011). 
Table 14. High prices of diesel in all parts of Sudan (cents per liter) 
   1991  1993  1995  1998  2000  2002  2004  2006  2008 
Ethiopia  14  19  24  25  27  32  42  62  89 
All parts of Sudan  6  58  25  26  24  24  29  49  125 
Uganda  55  71  85  68  75  70  88  101  122 
Source: GTZ. 
 
Inefficiencies due to underpricing of power, distributional losses, and lack of adequate revenue 
collection also add significant costs. In 2006 the tariffs levied recovered only a little over 60 percent of 
the total costs of power production. For every kilowatt-hour produced, the electric utility lost around 
$0.14 due to the underpricing of power. The net drain due to underpricing of power was around $2.7 
million per year. Additionally, losses in transmission and distribution have been estimated at 50 percent 
of total electricity produced, five times higher than good-practice standards and double what is observed 
in other parts of Africa in general. These represent monetary losses of up to $3.3 million a year. Further, 
despite enormous subsidies to end users implicit in non-cost-recovery tariffs, over 60 percent of electric 
bills go unpaid, adding a further $2.7 million to the inefficiency price tag. Overall, hidden costs for the 
SSEC are equivalent to around $9 million a year, or around 188 percent of the SSEC’s revenues—system 






































































































































































































































































underpricing to 57 percent (table 15). In terms of utility size, the SSEC encounters one of the highest 
hidden costs in Africa (figure 18). If SSEC is to expand access, redressing these hidden costs must be its 
first urgent priority. 






















2006  39  50  40  0.37  0.23  8.7  187 
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009); Southern Sudan statistical handbooks 2006–08; World Bank (2011). 
 
Figure 18. Benchmarking the SSEC’s high hidden costs due to inefficiencies  
 
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009); Southern Sudan statistical handbooks 2006–08; World Bank (2011). 
 
Improving South Sudan’s electricity situation requires a phased approach, starting with supporting 
and expanding off-grid electrification schemes. Programs that boost off-grid electrification through 
commercial means can be a viable option. These options not only enhance access to modern lighting in 
the absence of grid electrification but also boost private sector development. One such option is through 
the program Lightning Africa. Given the absence of any grid network in South Sudan, the most efficient 
and rapid way of providing lighting services to the people (particularly in rural areas) would be through 
the private sector by promoting the low-cost modern lighting offered by photovoltaic (PV) modules. The 
incorporation of South Sudan into the Lighting Africa program deserves consideration as a practical 
short-term solution to the country’s energy challenges. 
Lighting Africa is a joint International Finance Corporation (IFC) and World Bank program that has 
to accelerated the development of commercial off-grid lighting markets in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
program aims to mobilize the private sector to build sustainable markets to provide 2.5 million people 
with safe, affordable, and modern off-grid lighting by 2012 through a variety of tailor-made products, 
many of them in the form of PV solar lanterns. The longer-term goal is to eliminate market barriers for 
the private sector to bring these innovative products to 250 million Africans by 2030, who currently lack 
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significant socioeconomic, health, and environmental benefits such as new income-generation 
opportunities for small businesses. 
Given the capacity constraints faced in South Sudan, one possible approach to explore on the 
efficiency front would be the involvement of the private sector through a management contract with 
targeted incentives to improve some of the key efficiency parameters. In the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, for example, management contracts are being developed for the power and water utilities to 
address inefficiencies. A similar approach is being used for the Liberia Electricity Corporation. 
In the medium to long term, tapping into the Eastern Africa Power Pool’s (EAPP’s) energy market 
might also provide energy solutions for South Sudan. Leveraging cheap hydropower produced in Ethiopia 
through interconnections either through Kenya and Uganda will provide access to greater amounts of less-
expensive hydropower for South Sudan.  
In the long run, South Sudan could harness its massive hydropower capacity through the development 
of additional hydro-based generation. Exploiting the hydropower potential offers South Sudan three key 
benefits. First, in the long run the cost-recovery situation in South Sudan is more attainable (figure 19). 
Using a model that simulates optimal (least-cost) strategies for generating, transmitting, and distributing 
electricity in response to demand increases, it is estimated that the long-run marginal costs of producing 
power in Sudan would be about $0.13 per kWh, a substantial decrease from the existing $0.37 per kWh. 
The prevailing tariff will be able to recover long-run costs including capital costs.  
Figure 19. Existing tariffs for power are insufficient to recover huge operating costs and long-run marginal costs  
 
Source: AICD calculations. 
 
Second, developing South Sudan’s rich hydropower potential elevates South Sudan’s role as a key 
player in regional power trade. Expanding cross-border trade—trade expansion—to leverage lower-cost 
energy resources that are available in the region as a whole with the addition of cross-border transmission 
capacity to facilitate the flow of power from production to consumption locations. A counterfactual 
scenario—trade stagnation—assumes that no cross-border interconnectors will be built and countries will 
meet the incremental power demands through expansion of their domestic power sectors. South Sudan 
can boost its own energy supplies, reduce its reliance on oil-based generation, and wheel power to its East 









































interconnector capacity. Engaging in regional trade will enable South Sudan to make lucrative returns on 
the investment.  
Third, by increasing the share of hydropower in the regional generation portfolio, the region could 
save several million tonnes of carbon emissions a year. Under trade expansion, the weight of hydropower 
for all parts of Sudan will increase to over 90 percent, making the generation of power more 
environmentally sound. 
Information and communication technology 
Achievements 
A memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the Sudan and South Sudan has facilitated the 
development of a mobile market (albeit still in its early stages) in South Sudan. The MOU appointed the 
National Telecommunication Corporation (NTC) responsible for overall regulation, and allowed Sudatel, 
Zain, MTN, and Canar to provide nationwide services with Vivacell
2 and Gemtel
3 licensed to provide 
mobile services in South Sudan.
4 These companies were given access to start building or rebuilding their 
operations in South Sudan. The NTC was to be restructured with around one-third of its board composed 
of representatives from the South (News, November 12, 2008).  
Emergence of international mobile operators has facilitated some investments in telecommunications 
infrastructure. MTN and Zain have made significant enhancements in improving the telecommunications 
infrastructure of South Sudan. The presence of five mobile operators has facilitated an increase in the 
construction of several base towers. Zain’s, Gemtel’s, Sudani’s, and MTN’s towers now cover most of 
South Sudan’s large towns and are expected to expand to rural areas in the near future. As of 2010, there 
were some 317 base stations in South Sudan with Zain and MTN accounting for half of these (SSEC 
2010).  
Increased competition from several mobile operators has reduced prices. MTN has already provided 
cheaper service to South Sudanese who have relatives that fled from Sudan to East Africa. Further, 
MTN’s presence in 21 countries has facilitated special arrangements. MTN–MTN callers are allowed to 
make calls to Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda at half the price for international calls (Executive 
2009). 
The construction of an international gateway is now underway and can be expected to further reduce 
prices of calls and enhance performance. The MOU granted South Sudan the permission to build its own 
gateway in 2007. The contract was won by Ericsson and is expected to be completed in 2012. The 
gateway will enable the South Sudan to monitor call traffic made in the country and profit from operators 
who use it. All operators in principle have agreed to use separate southern gateways for calls. The 
                                                 
2 Vivacell, owned by Lebanese investors, launched service in 2009 under a license issued in 2007 to NOW (Reuters, 
February 23, 2009). 
3 Gemtel was launched by a Ugandan businessman. Some 80 percent was reportedly sold to an investment firm 
controlled by the Libyan government in 2010 (Wafula 2010).  
4 The Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Information and Communication (GoNU) and the 





gateway is also expected to drive down prices. The government-owned Gemtel currently uses Uganda’s 
gateway as opposed to Khartoum’s. Uganda charges South Sudan’s government $50,000 per year for 
gateway usage. Gemtel lost business in 2008 to MTN and Zain as users switched to save money. At 
present, to place a call to any of the over 20,000 Gemtel subscribers from any other operator in South 
Sudan, users have to wait until a Hong Kong satellite beams the call back via Uganda. This delay will be 
circumvented through the gateway (Executive 2009). 
Despite these recent advancements, the telecommunications industry is still in an incipient stage. 
According to the Minister of Telecommunications and Postal Services of South Sudan, there is no single 
ongoing project through South Sudan. The telecommunications and postal services inherited from the 
British are completely destroyed or liquidated by the war due to neglect.
5 While there have been some 
investments in infrastructure recently, ICT networks are still underdeveloped (figure 20 and annex 5). 




Rough estimates of South Sudan’s access to ICT services indicates overall very low levels of 
penetration. As of 2005, landline subscriptions were 0.11 per 100 people, a fraction of what is observed in 
Africa on average. The total number of active SIM cards is estimated at around 1 million–1.5 million, 
which puts the official penetration rate in South Sudan at around 12–18 percent, among the lowest in 
Africa in mid-2009. Based on these estimates, mobile penetration at 12 subscribers per 100 people is less 
than half of what is found in other parts of Africa. By comparison, Burundi has a penetration rate of 19 
                                                 
5 GOSS Ministry of Telecommunication and Postal Services Web site, ―Foreword from Minister,‖ 
www.motps.goss.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=47%3Aforeword-from-





percent, the Central African Republic and Chad are in the order of 30 percent, and Sierra Leone is close to 
40 percent.  
There is also very limited mobile penetration in South Sudan. Household surveys from 2009 suggest 
that only 18 percent of South Sudan’s households owned a cell phone. In contrast, over a third of the 
population in Sudan owns a cell phone. Estimates for 2011 set mobile ownership up to 25 percent of the 
population still below African averages. 
South Sudan records a low 7 users of the Internet per 100 people (table 16). Very low literacy rates in 
part drive low Internet usage. Further, less than 1 percent (0.7 percent) of the population owns a 
computer.  
Table 16. Benchmarking South Sudan’s ICT performance indicators 














years  2008  2008  2008  2008 
Access                  
GSM coverage  % population under signal    78  0.02  63  72 
International bandwidth  bits/person    18  11  25  39 
Internet  users/100 people    9  5  3.5  5.5 
Landline  subscribers/100 people  0.11  0.9  0.24  0.8  1.4 
Mobile phone  subscribers/100 people  12  38.2  21  24.4  33.1 
Source: Data for landline subscribers is from 2005 taken from the Central Bureau of Statistics South Sudan; Mobile phone 
subscriptions based on World Bank staff estimates for 2011; Internet users is for 2011 taken from Infoasaid (2011). 
Note: ICT = information and communication technology; GSM = global system for mobile communications. 
 
Consumers pay rather high prices for the ICT services that they have access to. Access to 
international ICT networks is via microwave links to satellite connections in neighboring countries. 
Gemtel has a microwave link to Uganda from where it connects to the fiber network of Uganda Telecom. 
International bandwidth is very limited in South Sudan and, as a result, prices are very high. Zain charges 
about 250 SDG for the modem and 50 SDG per month for a 2 GB connection. Vivacell and MTN also 
offer Internet services at roughly similar rates. VSATs
6 are far more expensive, costing anywhere between 
$500 and $4,000 a month depending on specifications. 
The quality of existing service is also rather poor. Mobile networks are still embryonic in nature. As a 
result, mobile phone users often have multiple SIM cards to combat patchy services and poor 
interconnections. Internet connectivity is also rather poor because modems link to the Internet via the 
mobile phone network, but connection speeds remain slow (Infoasaid 2011). 
Institutional obstacles imposed by the governments of Sudan and South Sudan have stymied the 
growth of the telecommunications market in the past. Despite a demand for fixed-line telephones, 
licensing arrangements precluded growth in landline connections. In 2005 total capacity of the telephone 
exchange was almost 9,400 customers and registered customers were as many as 8,856. The neglect of 
                                                 





South Sudan’s infrastructure has restricted capacity in the area of fixed-line telephony. Unless there are 
changes in the licensing agreements in South Sudan, fixed-line telephones are not expected to have 
increased significantly. 
Further, the fact that operators licensed to operate in South Sudan have not developed their network 
more fully indicates that there are noncommercial barriers to expansion. Non–South Sudanese operators 
report that they have had difficulties obtaining permission from the government to operate in South 
Sudan. The South Sudanese operators (NOW and Gemtel) also have not been issued with formal licenses 
recognized by the GNU. In the past this had made it difficult for them to raise finance to invest in 
networks. 
South Sudan has yet to connect to the undersea cable, which has proven to decrease prices for ICT 
services in other countries considerably. Evidence shows that Sub-Saharan Africa’s access to the 
submarine cable has generally reduced costs of ICT services when international gateways are present 
(table 17). According to Sudatel, an optical fiber to South Sudan was planned as part of the nationwide 
backbone (figure 21) but its status is unclear. The existing backbone transmission is believed to be 
through microwave with eventual connectivity to fiber optic in the north and onward to Port Sudan for 
international connectivity through undersea cables. One possible option for landlocked South Sudan to 
gain access to the undersea fiber-optic network is through a backbone from Juba to the Kenyan border.  
South Sudan needs to add around 643 km to connect to the fiber-optic cable and establish a strong 
ICT backbone. South Sudan is missing a link to connect to Uganda, which has largely achieved 
connectivity to the fiber-optic backbone. Adding these missing kilometers of cable would allow South 
Sudan to connect to the Ugandan border from Malakal via Juba. Meanwhile, Sudatel has financed the 
construction of fiber from Khartoum to Malakal.  




Call to the 
United States 
Internet  
dial-up  Internet ADSL 
Without submarine cable  1.34  0.86  68  283 
With submarine cable  0.57  0.48  47  111 
  Monopoly on international gateway  0.70  0.72  37  120 
  Competitive international gateway  0.48  0.23  37  98 
Source: AICD calculations. 





Figure 21. Sudatel’s fiber-optic network 
 
Source: Sudatel’s Annual Report 2008. 
Financing Sudan’s infrastructure 
To meet its most pressing infrastructure needs, South Sudan has to significantly improve the quantity 
and quality of infrastructure in key areas. For the purpose of this report, illustrative targets have been set 
using standardized criteria but also taking into account the starting conditions of the region’s 
infrastructure. In the case of South Sudan, the existing conditions are extremely daunting and it is simply 
not realistic to expect—even in the most optimistic scenario—that South Sudan would catch up with 
Sudan or any well-performing developing country in a period of 10 years or even more. It is reasonable to 
assume, however, that the water and sanitation Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) can be attained 
using a modest and practical mix of technological options and doubling electrification to 5 percent. In the 
case of transport, national connectivity involves connecting centers with populations larger than 25,000 
people. This translates into a requirement of 1,192 km of roads in good condition in the south. What is 
seen below are development targets that are driven by the country’s own circumstances (table 18). 





Table 18. Illustrative investment targets for infrastructure in South Sudan 






  Install fiber-optic links to neighboring capitals and 
submarine cable. 
 
  Provide universal access to GSM signal and public 
broadband facilities: add 1,299 base stations for 




  Assuming trade stagnation, estimate optimal (least-
cost) investment strategies for generating, 
transmitting, and distributing electricity in response 
to demand increases. 
  Develop 222 MW of new generation capacity (no-
trade scenario). 
  This scenario could be replaced under trade 
expansion with 1,540 MW of generation capacity 
(and the needed megawatts in interconnectors). 
  Achieve exogenously determined electrification 
rates: Raise electrification from 1 percent to 5 
percent of the population (10 percent urban, 3 
percent rural). 
Transport    Achieve regional and national connectivity with 
good-quality 1-lane paved road by adding or 
rehabilitating to good condition: 1,193 km for 
national connectivity, 1,307 km for regional 
connectivity, 1,085 km in urban areas, and 6,969 km 
in rural areas. 
  Provide rural road access to 100 percent of the 
highest-value agricultural land based on current 
production, plus providing rural road access to 50 
percent of the nonproductive agricultural land with 
highest potential. 
  Provide urban road access within 500 square 
meters. 
Water supply and 
sanitation 
    Achieve Millennium Development Goals by 
preserving the current mix of sanitation 
technological options and clearing sector 
rehabilitation backlog. 
  Increase population rates with access to improved 
water to 67 percent and with access to improved 
sanitation to 61 percent. 
  Increase access to improved water to 67 percent 
by achieving the following technology mix: piped 
water (38% urban, 0% rural), stand posts (13% 
urban, 2% rural), safe wells (50% urban, 89% 
rural). 
Source: Mayer and others 2009; Rosnes and Vennemo 2009; Carruthers, Krishnamani, and Murray 2009; You and others 2009. 
Note: GSM = global system for mobile communications; MW = megawatts. 
 
Only by using an incremental but sustained approach to infrastructure improvements will the 
challenges faced by South Sudan be manageable. South Sudan has to deal with the difficulties of being 
predominantly rural and unpopulated, even as its institutional capacity is starting out from a very meager 
point. Such challenges call for the use of innovative and more modest technological combinations to 
allow for incremental improvements at a good development pace. The burden of needed spending in 
terms of the size of the economy is a daunting 23 percent of GDP (table 19). 
In absolute terms, meeting the illustrative infrastructure targets would cost $1.4 billion per year over a 
decade. Capital expenditure would account for 80 percent of this requirement. The transport sector has the 
highest spending needs—about $711 million—largely driven by the requirement to provide for rural road 
accessibility that, at $362 million, represents the single-largest item on South Sudan’s spending agenda. 
This includes providing 100 percent access to the land currently hosting the highest agricultural value as 
well as expanding access to 50 percent of the land with the highest agricultural value potential not yet 
productive. If South Sudan were only to provide full rural accessibility to its already productive 





standards). But the latter would also guarantee road access to less than one-third of the land with 
suitability for agricultural production.  
Table 19. Indicative infrastructure spending needs in South Sudan for 2006 to 2015 




maintenance  Total needs 
 
Total needs 
ICT  78  21  99  1.64 
Irrigation  —  —  —  — 
Power (nontrade)  179  29  209  3.46 
Transport   524  187  711  11.80 
Water supply and sanitation  303  45  348  5.78 
Total  1,084  282  1,367  22.7 
Source: Mayer and others 2009; Rosnes and Vennemo 2009; Carruthers, Krishnamani, and Murray 2009; You and others, AICD 2009. 
Derived from models that are available online at www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/models. 
Note: ICT = information and communication technology. 
— = Not available. 
 
The water and sanitation sector is also in disarray, with the second-highest spending needs. About 
$350 million per year—or 6 percent of South Sudan’s GDP—is needed to meet the MDGs in water and 
sanitation. The water supply and sanitation estimates consider improving the technology mix used to 
provide improved services. This means that population would get improved services not only through 
cheaper and simpler technologies (protected boreholes or latrines) but the share of the population getting 
high-end services (piped water or sewerage) would increase, albeit modestly, over time relative to the 
other means. The power infrastructure requirements for South Sudan represent another big item, at an 
estimated $209 million per year. Yet, this only assumes meeting domestic demand.  
Needs estimates for ICT are the lowest only because of the recent developments of the ICT sector, 
which has been financed by, and is expected to receive more, private sector financing. The estimates are 
modest as they do not include the cost of linking any of the regional gateways to submarine cables.  
South Sudan’s infrastructure spending needs, at about 23 percent of GDP, are twice as high as other 
resource-rich economies in Africa and broadly comparable to those of LICs such as Kenya, Senegal, and 
Madagascar (figure 22). Investment needs are about 18 percent of GDP, accounting for 75–80 percent of 
total needs.  
In absolute terms, South Sudan already spends over $450 billion per year to meet its infrastructure 
needs. This is equivalent to around 7.5 percent in terms of the size of the economy (table 20). These 
numbers position both South Sudan among average spenders in Africa, comparable to what MICs spend 
and perhaps slighter higher than other resource-rich countries (figure 23). Most of the traceable spending 
goes to capital investment, and maintenance flows seem to be almost nonexistent. Most of the spending of 
the south comes from the public sector and has garnered minimal interest from non–Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (non-OECD) investors and the private sector, until recently.  





Figure 22. South Sudan’s infrastructure spending needs in a regional context, as a share of GDP 
Estimated infrastructure spending needed to meet targets, as percentage of GDP 
 
Source: Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2009. 
Note: Values excludes irrigation. 
LIC = low-income country; MIC = middle-income country; COMESA = Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; GDP = gross domestic product; O&M = operations and maintenance; CAPEX = 
capital expenditure. 
 
China has an active presence in neighboring countries and is yet to make substantial investments in 
South Sudan. The largest single financier of infrastructure in Sudan is China, followed by India and Arab 
countries. Together these account for 40 percent of Sudan’s total annual investments, almost entirely 
allocated to the power sector.  
Table 20. Financial flows to South Sudan’s infrastructure, average 2001 to 2005 
$ millions per year 










sector  ODA 
Non-OECD 
financiers  PPI 
Total 
CAPEX 
ICT  0.6  0.0  —  0.0  49.5  49.5  50.2  0.83 
Irrigation  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  — 
Power   18.4  12.6  —  0.0  0.0  12.6  31.0  0.51 
Transport   13.0  349.7  —  0.0  3.3  353.1  366.0  6.08 
WSS  4.2  0.2  —  0.0  0.0  0.2  4.4  0.07 
Total  36.2  362.5  —  0.0  52.9  415.4  451.6  7.50 
Source: Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). 
Note: O&M = operations and maintenance; ODA = official development assistance; PPI = private participation in infrastructure; CAPEX = 
capital expenditure; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; WSS = water supply and sanitation; ICT = information 
and communication technology; GDP = gross domestic product. 
 





















Figure 23. South Sudan’s existing infrastructure spending is average by African standards 
 
Source: Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2009. 
Note: Values excludes irrigation. 
LIC = low-income country; MIC = middle-income country; COMESA = Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; SSA = Sub-Saharan 
Africa; GDP = gross domestic product; O&M = operations and maintenance; CAPEX = capital expenditure. 
 
Capital  investments  in  the  south  have  clearly  been  concentrated  in  transport  infrastructure  and 
financed by the public sector (figure 24). 
Figure 24. South Sudan’s pattern of capital investment in infrastructure  
Investment in infrastructure sectors as percentage of GDP, by source
 
 
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009). 
Note: Private investment includes self-financing by households. ODA = official development assistance; OECD = Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development; ICT = information and communication technology; GDP = gross domestic product; WSS = water supply and 
sanitation; LIC = low-income country. 







































How much more can be done within the existing resource envelope? 
Even without increasing spending, more resources could be directed toward infrastructure by 
eliminating inefficiencies. This report quantifies some operational inefficiencies based on measurable and 
observable performance indicators. Two types of operational inefficiencies are included. The first type 
relates to operators and/or infrastructure providers, which include utilities, state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), and, to some extent, special funds. For this type of estimate, providers within South Sudan will 
be compared against well-functioning utilities in Africa and/or engineering firms. In this group one finds 
measurements of (i) underrecovery of costs: comparing effective tariffs and user fees against actual unit 
costs of providing the service, (ii) overstaffing: assessing the difference between average labor cost per 
connection of the utility evaluated against a well-functioning utility, (iii) distribution losses: assessing the 
difference between the distribution losses of the evaluated system against engineering firms having 
similar age and characteristics; and (iv) undercollection: assessing the ability of the operator to collect 
emitted bills against a full collection ratio within the year. The second type of inefficiencies is a broad 
measure of the ability of governmental agencies to execute their budget allocations for capital projects 
within the fiscal year.  
For South Sudan, inefficiencies are dominated by the burden of poor execution of capital budgets. 
They amount to $35 million annually that, while small in terms of GDP (barely a 0.6 percent), are telling 
in terms of highlighting the importance of strengthening public expending management capabilities and 
institutions to make sure that, in an environment with already limited resources (by comparison to needs), 
available budgets are fully spent (CEM 2010).  
South Sudan’s operational inefficiencies are a mere 0.01 percent of GDP but represent two times the 
revenues of operators. In other words, the burden of these inefficiencies to the economy as a whole is still 
small only because the network is extremely underdeveloped (almost nonexistent). The implications are 
terrible in terms of expanding power and piped water services to more customers. It is not realistic or 
even feasible to expect expanding the power and water distribution network via utilities at the existing 
level of operational inefficiencies.  
Table 21. South Sudan’s potential gains from greater operational efficiency 
$ million per year  ICT  Irrigation  Power  Transport  WSS  Total 
Total as share 
of GDP 
Under-recovery of costs  —  —  0.2  —  —  0.2  0.00 
Overstaffing  —  —  —  —  —  —  — 
Distribution losses  —  —  0.1  —  —  0.1  0.00 
Undercollection  —  —  0.4  —  —  0.4  0.01 
Low budget execution  0.0  —  0.0  35.2  0.1  35.4  0.59 
Total  0.0  —  0.7  35.2  0.1  36.1  0.60 
Source: Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). 
Note: WSS = water supply and sanitation; ICT = information and communication technology; GDP = gross domestic product. 





Annual funding gap 
South Sudan’s annual infrastructure funding gap amounts to $879 million per year, or roughly 15 
percent of GDP (table 22). The largest funding gap—equivalent to 40 percent of South Sudan’s needs—is 
attributable to the water and sanitation sector. Transport comes a close second, with its needs representing 
35 percent of the total. Power comes a distant, yet very significant, third. 
The estimation of the funding gap assumes two key issues. First, existing spending is allocated to 
areas where spending needs have been already identified. From this perspective, some resources could 
hypothetically be reallocated from sector A to sector B to increase the economic returns to that spending. 
But there is not much potential in South Sudan for reallocation. Second, funding gap estimations assume 
the country can eliminate the existing inefficiencies in spending overnight. From this perspective, the 
funding gap estimate is a lower bound. Yet, funding gaps look implausibly large when measured relative 
to the existing annual spending flows.  
To cover the annual infrastructure funding gaps, the country would essentially need to more than 
double its current level of infrastructure spending from 7.5 to 14.6 percent of GDP.  
Table 22. Funding gaps by sector 




Spending needs  (99)  —  (209)  (711)  (348)  (1,367)  (22.7) 
Existing spending  50   —  31   366   4   452   7.5  
Efficiency gains  0   —  1   35   0   36   0.6  
Funding gap  (49)  —  (177)  (310)  (343)  (879)  (14.6) 
Source: Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). 
Note: Estimates use the base scenario of spending needs. Potential overspending across sectors is not included in the calculation of the 
funding gap, because it cannot be assumed that it would be applied toward other infrastructure sectors. 
WSS = water supply and sanitation; ICT = information and communication technology; GDP = gross domestic product. 
—.= Not available 
What else can be done?  
South Sudan’s funding gap is very large relative to the size of its economy, and enormous with 
respect to its current level of spending. Nevertheless, there are a number of options for making it more 
manageable, including raising additional finance, taking additional cost-cutting measures, and 
lengthening the period of time allotted for meeting the illustrative infrastructure targets. In any case, given 
the magnitude of the gap, difficult decisions will have to be taken regarding the prioritization of the 
different investments. 
There are, however, realistic prospects for increasing the flow of resources to infrastructure. Although 
not all components of the required infrastructure platform are suitable for private finance (particularly 
roads, water, and sanitation), other components may be (for example, ICT, power generation, and ports). 
Challenges for attracting private investors are conspicuous particularly due to the country risks linked to 





South Sudan has not attracted as much private finance into infrastructure as other African peers. Over 
the early 2000s, private flows into ICT and a 2006 seaport concession near Juba were equivalent to 
slightly less than 1 percent of GDP. Many other African countries have done significantly better in this 
area, suggesting there is room for capturing additional resources vis-à-vis the size of the economy (figure 
25). Countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya, and Senegal 
have all captured between 1.8 and 2.5 percent of GDP, while the most successful country in this regard—
Guinea-Bissau—has captured in excess of 3 percent of GDP.  
Figure 25. Numerous African countries capture more private investment than South Sudan 
 
Source: PPI Project Database. (http://ppi.worldbank.org), in current $ millions. 
 
China and India might be sources of additional funding given the track record of these investors in 
neighboring countries, particularly Sudan in the power sector. In fact one project financed by China ($200 
million)  has  already  been  identified—though  not  confirmed—for  developing  power  distribution  for 
villages and rural areas in the White Nile State. The role of donors is also expected to increase, which is 
critical in making the funding gap manageable. 
Adopting lower-cost technologies could substantially reduce the cost of meeting the posited 
infrastructure targets, and help make the funding gap manageable. Meeting the MDGs for water supply 
and sanitation with lower-cost technologies than previously used (such as stand posts, boreholes, and 
improved latrines), could reduce the associated price tag from $348 million to $223 million. Similarly, 
meeting transport connectivity standards using lower-cost road-surfacing technologies (such as single-
surface treatment) as well as providing  rural accessibility access to the currently active agricultural land, 
could reduce the associated price tag from $711 million to $232 million in South Sudan. The overall 
savings from these measures would amount to a sizable $605 million for South Sudan (table 23). 
Table 23. Savings from innovation 
$ millions  Before innovation  After innovation  Savings  Savings as % of 
sector funding gap 
WSS appropriate technology  348  223  125  37 
Roads appropriate technology  711  232  479  155 
Total  1,059  454  605   
Source: Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia, AICD Flagship Report, 2009. 




















Finally, if all else fails, it may be necessary to realistically extend the time horizon for meeting the 
infrastructure targets beyond the illustrative period considered here. In the case of South Sudan, the total 
amount of inefficiencies is low relative to the economy, as the actual provision of services is almost 
nonexistent. Therefore, redressing inefficiencies will result in only modest gains. 
Within the overall funding envelope, it will be very important to carefully prioritize infrastructure 
investments. Given the magnitude of the country’s funding gap, it will require particular effort to do this 
without  neglecting  certain  sectors.  Hence  the  need  to  identify  priorities.  The  foregoing  analysis  of 
achievements and challenges suggests the importance of prioritizing key infrastructure interventions for 
the economy.  






Annex 1. The number of flights per week between South Sudan and selected neighbors 
   Ethiopia  Kenya 
South 
Sudan  Uganda 
Ethiopia        4    
Kenya        34    
South Sudan  4  26     17 
Uganda        21    
Source: Bofinger 2009. 
Annex 2. Benchmarking the speed of South Sudan’s air service in kilometers per hour 
   Ethiopia  Kenya 
South 
Sudan  Uganda 
Ethiopia        521    
Kenya        618    
South Sudan  521  552     453 
Uganda        342    
Source: Bofinger 2009. 
 
Annex 3. Status of African air transport safety oversight, using several criteria 
 





Annex 4. Benchmarking the number of mobile subscribers in all parts of Sudan against selected African countries 






All parts of Sudan  527,233  1,048,558  1,702,449  4,721,443  8,218,092  11,186,548  13,475,000  57 
Egypt  5,797,530  7,585,000  12,828,000  17,787,000  30,065,242  41,272,473  55,352,233  39 
Ethiopia  51,234  155,534  410,630  866,700  1,208,498  1,954,327  4,051,703  69 
Kenya  1,590,785  3,421,343  5,329,000  7,273,000  11,349,000  16,233,833  19,364,559  41 
Nigeria  3,149,472  9,174,209  18,295,896  32,184,861  40,395,611  62,988,492  73,099,310  50 
Tanzania  1,041,000  1,852,000  3,400,000  5,607,000  8,328,000  13,006,793  17,469,486  47 
South Africa  17,938,000  23,243,000  30,899,000  37,740,000  43,854,000  50,019,000  50,069,000  18 
Uganda  776,169  1,165,035  1,525,125  2,326,000  5,163,414  8,554,864  9,383,734  45 
Source: Adapted from Ampah and others 2009. 
 
Annex 5. Existing and planned transmission backbones in all parts of Sudan 
 
Source: Mayer and others 2009. 





Bibliography and references 
This country report draws upon a wide range of papers, databases, models, and maps that were 
created as part of the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic. All of these can be downloaded from the 
project Web site: www.infrastructureafrica.org. For papers go to the document page 
(www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/documents), for databases to the data page 
(www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data), for models go to the models page 
(www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/models), and for maps to the map page 
(www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/maps). The references for the papers that were used to compile 
this country report are provided in the table below. 
General 
AICD (Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic). Africa’s Infrastructure: A Time for Transformation. 
www.infrastructureafrica.org. 
Foster, Vivien, and Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia, eds. 2009. Africa’s Infrastructure: A Time for 
Transformation. Paris and Washington, DC: Agence Française de Développement and World 
Bank.  
Financing 
Briceño-Garmendia, Cecilia, Karlis Smits, and Vivien Foster. 2009. ―Financing Public Infrastructure in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: Patterns and Emerging Issues.‖ AICD Background Paper 15, Africa Region, 
World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Growth 
Calderón, César. 2009. ―Infrastructure and Growth in Africa.‖ Policy Research Working Paper 4914, 
World Bank, Washington, DC.  
Escribano, Alvaro, J. Luis Guasch, and Jorge Pena. 2010. ―Assessing the Impact of Infrastructure Quality 
on Firm Productivity in Africa.‖ Policy Research Working Paper 5191, World Bank, Washington, 
DC. 
Yepes, Tito, Justin Pierce, and Vivien Foster. 2009. ―Making Sense of Africa’s Infrastructure 
Endowment: A Benchmarking Approach.‖ Policy Research Working Paper 4912, World Bank, 





Information and communication technologies 
Ampah, Mavis, Daniel Camos, Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia, Michael Minges, Maria Shkaratan, and Mark 
Williams. 2009. ―Information and Communications Technology in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Sector 
Review.‖ AICD Background Paper 10, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Executive. 2009. South Sudan connection comes calling. Executive Magazine, Issue 115, February 2009.  
http://executive-magazine.com/getarticle.php?article=11532 




Infosaid. 2011. Infoasaid Sudan media and telecoms landscape guide. Infoasaid Sudan media and 
telecoms landscape guide 
Mayer, Rebecca, Ken Figueredo, Mike Jensen, Tim Kelly, Richard Green, and Alvaro Federico Barra. 
2009. ―Connecting the Continent: Costing the Needs for Spending on ICT Infrastructure in 
Africa.‖ AICD Background Paper 3, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Ministry of Telecommunication and Postal Services. 2008. ―Southern Sudan to Own Communication 
Gateway.‖ News, November 12.  
Reuters. 2009. ―Mobile Phone Network Launched in South Sudan.‖ February 23. 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/02/23/oukin-uk-sudan-south-telecoms-
idUKTRE51M5YL20090223. 
Wafula, Walter. 2010. ―Libyan Firm Acquires South Sudan’s Gemtel.‖ Daily Monitor, February 15. 
www.monitor.co.ug/Business/-/688322/861854/-/view/printVersion/-/an77e4z/-/index.html. 
Irrigation 
Svendsen, Mark, Mandy Ewing, and Siwa Msangi. 2008. ―Watermarks: Indicators of Irrigation Sector 
Performance in Africa.‖ AICD Background Paper 4, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, 
DC. 
You, L., C. Ringler, G. Nelson, U. Wood-Sichra, R. Robertson, S. Wood, G. Zhe, T. Zhu, and Y. Sun. 
2009. ―Torrents and Trickles: Irrigation Spending Needs in Africa.‖ AICD Background Paper 9, 
Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Power 
Briceño-Garmendia and Shkaratan. 2010. Power Tariffs: Caught between Cost Recovery and 





Eberhard, Anton, Vivien Foster, Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia, Fatimata Ouedraogo, Daniel Camos, and 
Maria Shkaratan. 2008. ―Underpowered: The State of the Power Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa.‖ 
AICD Background Paper 6, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Foster, Vivien, and Jevgenijs Steinbuks. 2009. ―Paying the Price for Unreliable Power Supplies: In-House 
Generation of Electricity by Firms in Africa.‖ Policy Research Working Paper 4913, World Bank, 
Washington, DC. 
Rosnes, Orvika, and Haakon Vennemo. 2009. ―Powering Up: Costing Power Infrastructure Spending 
Needs in Sub-Saharan Africa.‖ AICD Background Paper 5, Africa Region, World Bank, 
Washington, DC. 
Transport 
Bofinger, Heinrich C. 2009. ―An Unsteady Course: Growth and Challenges in Africa’s Air Transport 
Industry.‖ AICD Background Paper 16, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Bullock, Richard. 2009. ―Off Track: Sub-Saharan African Railways.‖ AICD Background Paper 17, Africa 
Region, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Carruthers, Robin, Ranga Rajan Krishnamani, and Siobhan Murray. 2009. ―Improving Connectivity: 
Investing in Transport Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa.‖ AICD Background Paper 7, Africa 
Region, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Gwilliam, Ken, Vivien Foster, Rodrigo Archondo-Callao, Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia, Alberto Nogales, 
and Kavita Sethi. 2008. ―The Burden of Maintenance: Roads in Sub-Saharan Africa.‖ AICD 
Background Paper 14, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Kumar, Ajay, and Fanny Barrett. 2008. ―Stuck in Traffic: Urban Transport in Africa.‖ AICD Background 
Paper 1, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Ocean Shipping Consultants, Inc. 2009. ―Beyond the Bottlenecks: Ports in Africa.‖ AICD Background 
Paper 8, Africa Region, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Sudan Tribune. 2011. South Sudan: Fuel crisis hits, prices soar after referendum. January 28. 
http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-Fuel-crisis-hits,37804 
Teravaninthorn, Supee, and Gael Raballand. 2009. Transport Prices and Costs in Africa. Washington, 
DC: World Bank. 
Water supply and sanitation 
Banerjee, Sudeshna, Vivien Foster, Yvonne Ying, Heather Skilling, and Quentin Wodon. ―Cost 
Recovery, Equity, and Efficiency in Water Tariffs: Evidence from African Utilities.‖ AICD 
Working Paper 7, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Banerjee, Sudeshna, Heather Skilling, Vivien Foster, Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia, Elvira Morella, and 
Tarik Chfadi. 2008. ―Ebbing Water, Surging Deficits: Urban Water Supply in Sub-Saharan 





Gulyani, Sumila, Debabrata Talukdar, and Darby Jack. 2009. ―Poverty, Living Conditions, and 
Infrastructure Access: A Comparison of Slums in Dakar, Johannesburg, and Nairobi.‖ AICD 
Working Paper 10, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Keener, Sarah, Manuel Luengo, and Sudeshna Banerjee. 2009. ―Provision of Water to the Poor in Africa: 
Experience with Water Standposts and the Informal Water Sector.‖ AICD Working Paper 13, 
World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Morella, Elvira, Vivien Foster, and Sudeshna Ghosh Banerjee. 2008. ―Climbing the Ladder: The State of 
Sanitation in Sub-Saharan Africa.‖ AICD Background Paper 13, Africa Region, World Bank, 
Washington, DC. 
Other 
Alexeeva, Padam, and Queiroz. 2008. ―Monitoring Road Works Contracts and Unit Costs, or Enhanced 
Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. World Bank.‖ Transport Papers TP-21. Washington DC. 
African Ministers Council on Water (AMCOW). 2010. ―Country Status Overviews on Water Supply and 
Sanitation 2010.‖ Regional Synthesis Report, August 2010. Draft presentation 
https://www.wsp.org/wsp/sites/wsp.org/files/userfiles/WSP_AMCOW_CSO2.pdf 
———. 2010. ―Southern Sudan: Country Status Overview on Water Supply and Sanitation.‖ Draft report 
(for circulation to Biannual Review participants), December 2009.  
Arvis, Jean-Francois, Gael Raballand, and Jean-Francois Marteau. 2009. The Cost of Being Landlocked: 
Logistics Costs and Supply Chain Reliability. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4258. 
Washington DC. 
Christ, Nannette, and Michael Ferrantino. 2009. ―The Effects of Cost, Time, and Uncertainty in Sub-
Saharan Africa.‖ Draft Paper, U.S. International Trade Commission, Washington, DC. 
EIA (United States Energy Information Administration). 2009. ―Sudan Country Energy Brief 2009.‖ 
www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Sudan/Background.html. 
Financial Standards Foundation. 2010. ―Country Brief: Sudan.‖ New York: E-standards Forum. 
IBNET (The International Benchmarking Network for Water and Sanitation Utilities). 2011. www.ib-
net.org/. 
JICA (Japanese International Cooperation Agency). 2009. ―Juba Urban Water Supply Capacity 
Development Study in the Southern Sudan.‖ Interim Report I. Tokyo. 
Keener, Sarah, Manuel Luengo, and Sudeshna Banerjee. 2009. ―Provision of Water to the Poor in Africa: 
Experience with Water Standposts and the Informal Water Sector.‖ AICD Working Paper 13, 
World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Louis Berger Group and Doshi Borgan & Partners. 2010. ―Sudan National Transport Master Plan: 
Executive Summary.‖ Prepared for the Ministry of Finance and National Economy and Ministry 





MoWRI (Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, Government of Southern Sudan). 2007. ―Draft 
Water Policy.‖ Juba. 
———. 2010. ―GoSS Water Strategic Framework.‖ Advanced draft, Juba.  
Nathan Associates. 2010. ―Definition and Investment Strategy for a Core Strategic Transport Network for 
Eastern and Southern Africa: Corridor Review and Performance Report.‖ Draft Document 
submitted to the World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Platts. 2006. WEPP database. 
———. 2009. WEPP database. 
Southern Sudan Center for Census, Statistics and Evaluation. 2010. Statistical Yearbook for Southern 
Sudan 2010. Juba. 
WHO (World Health Organization) Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP). 2010a. ―Sudan Estimates for the 
Use of Improved Drinking-Water Sources.‖ www.wssinfo.org/resources/documents.html. 
———. 2010b. ―Sudan Estimates for the Use of Improved Sanitation Facilities.‖ 
www.wssinfo.org/resources/documents.html. 
World Bank. 2007. ―Ethiopia Power Export Project Stage 2: Ethiopia-Sudan Interconnector Project.‖ 
World Bank Project Appraisal Document, Washington, DC. 
———. 2008. ―Revitalizing Sudan’s Non-Oil Exports: A Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS).‖ 
Prepared for the Integrated Framework Program, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
———. 2009a. ―Sudan: The Road toward Sustainable and Broad-based Growth.‖ Poverty Reduction and 
Economic Management Unit, Africa Region. Washington, DC. 
———. 2009b. ―Sudan Investment Climate.‖ Finance and Private Sector Development Unit, Africa 
Region, Washington, DC. 
———. 2010a. ―Sudan Poverty Assessment. Part 1: Poverty Profile of the Northern States.‖ Draft 
version, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Africa Region, Washington, DC. 
———. 2010b. ―Sudan Poverty Assessment. Part 1: Poverty Profile of the Southern States.‖ Draft 
version, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Africa Region, World Bank, 
Washington, DC. 
———. 2010c. ―Sudan: Issues in Urban Development: Phase 1—Overview of the Urban Landscape.‖ 
Urban and Water Unit / Sustainable Development Department, Africa Region, World Bank, 
Washington, DC.  
———. 2011. ―Energy Sector Strategy Note for South Sudan.‖ Draft note, World Bank, Washington, 
DC.  
Yoshino, Yuataka. 2010. ―Presentation of Key Findings from the Trade Facilitation Assessment Field 





Yoshino, Yutaka, and others. 2009. ―Upper Nile State Growth Diagnostics: A Southern Sudan State Case 
Study.‖ Unpublished background paper Sudan: The Road Toward Sustainable and Broad-based 




About AICD and its country reports 
This study is a product of the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD), a project designed to 
expand the world’s knowledge of physical infrastructure in Africa. AICD provides a baseline against 
which future improvements in infrastructure services can be measured, making it possible to monitor the 
results achieved from donor support. It also offers a solid empirical foundation for prioritizing 
investments and designing policy reforms in Africa’s infrastructure sectors.  
The AICD is based on an unprecedented effort to collect detailed economic and technical data on African 
infrastructure. The project has produced a series of original reports on public expenditure, spending 
needs, and sector performance in each of the main infrastructure sectors, including energy, information 
and communication technologies, irrigation, transport, and water and sanitation. Africa’s Infrastructure—
A Time for Transformation, published by the World Bank and the Agence Française de Développement in 
November 2009, synthesized the most significant findings of those reports.  
The focus of the AICD country reports is on benchmarking sector performance and quantifying the main 
financing and efficiency gaps at the country level. These reports are particularly relevant to national 
policy makers and development partners working on specific countries. 
The AICD was commissioned by the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa following the 2005 G8 (Group 
of Eight) summit at Gleneagles, Scotland, which flagged the importance of scaling up donor finance for 
infrastructure in support of Africa’s development.  
The AICD’s first phase focused on 24 countries that together account for 85 percent of the gross domestic 
product, population, and infrastructure aid flows of Sub-Saharan Africa. The countries are: Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, 
South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Under a second phase of the project, coverage was 
expanded to include as many of the remaining African countries as possible.  
Consistent with the genesis of the project, the main focus is on the 48 countries south of the Sahara that 
face the most severe infrastructure challenges. Some components of the study also cover North African 
countries so as to provide a broader point of reference. Unless otherwise stated, therefore, the term 
―Africa‖ is used throughout this report as a shorthand for ―Sub-Saharan Africa.‖ 
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